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Metacognition, social cognition, and
mentalizing in psychosis: are these distinct
constructs when it comes to subjective
experience or are we just splitting hairs?
P. H. Lysaker1,2* , S. Cheli3, G. Dimaggio4, B. Buck5, K. A. Bonfils6, K. Huling7, C. Wiesepape8 and J. T. Lysaker9
Abstract
Research using the integrated model of metacognition has suggested that the construct of metacognition could
quantify the spectrum of activities that, if impaired, might cause many of the subjective disturbances found in
psychosis. Research on social cognition and mentalizing in psychosis, however, has also pointed to underlying
deficits in how persons make sense of their experience of themselves and others. To explore the question of
whether metacognitive research in psychosis offers unique insight in the midst of these other two emerging fields,
we have offered a review of the constructs and research from each field. Following that summary, we discuss ways
in which research on metacognition may be distinguished from research on social cognition and mentalizing in
three broad categories: (1) experimental procedures, (2) theoretical advances, and (3) clinical applications or
indicated interventions. In terms of its research methods, we will describe how metacognition makes a unique
contribution to understanding disturbances in how persons make sense of and interpret their own experiences
within the flow of life. We will next discuss how metacognitive research in psychosis uniquely describes an
architecture which when compromised – as often occurs in psychosis – results in the loss of persons’ sense of
purpose, possibilities, place in the world and cohesiveness of self. Turning to clinical issues, we explore how
metacognitive research offers an operational model of the architecture which if repaired or restored should
promote the recovery of a coherent sense of self and others in psychosis. Finally, we discuss the concrete
implications of this for recovery-oriented treatment for psychosis as well as the need for further research on the
commonalities of these approaches.
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Background
Extensive and converging evidence suggests that alter-
ations in the ways persons diagnosed with psychosis
understand and think about themselves and others sig-
nificantly influences the course of their disorder [1–4].
This has fueled research on the processes that might
undermine or enhance self-experience [5]. For example,
interest has grown in describing and measuring aspects
related to self-experience, which if compromised, may
contribute to the loss of agency and self-coherence, and
if recaptured, may enable recovery from psychosis [6].
One emerging line of research has suggested that the
construct of metacognition could quantify the spectrum
of activities that, if impaired, might cause the subjective
disturbances found in psychosis [7]. This research relies
on an integrative model which understands metacogni-
tion as a spectrum of activities that includes awareness
of specific discrete experiences as well as an understand-
ing of how those specific experiences are connected in
one’s broader life experience. This awareness is thought
to enable a sense of self and others that impacts moment-
ary experience [6]. This integrated model of metacogni-
tion has suggested that reduction in the capacity for
metacognitive activity could derail a person’s ability to ef-
fectively make sense of and manage the challenges related
to psychosis [8]. This work has similarly suggested that
the improvement of metacognitive function amid psych-
osis could enable persons to make personally meaningful
sense of their challenges, and then direct their own recov-
ery and pursue a personally meaningful life [9].
While the integrated model of metacognition has gen-
erated novel models of the mechanisms of psychosocial
treatment for persons with psychosis [10–13], criticisms
have been raised concerning whether it is truly distinct
from several other constructs related to how persons
form ideas about themselves and others. Specifically, it
has been asked whether metacognition adds something
unique to science beyond what is offered by research on
the constructs of mentalizing and social cognition [14–
17]. Understanding the extent to which the phenomenon
measured in metacognitive research is distinct from the
phenomena measured by social cognition and mentaliz-
ing research is essential for interpreting findings from
these rapidly expanding fields. Such distinctions further
ensure that we do not obscure the chances for discovery
by studying the same phenomenon with different labels.
To address this question, a comparison of these pro-
grams of research in terms of measurement, findings,
and applications is needed. When examining whether
two research approaches to a similar subject differ, it is
expedient to compare their research tools. For example,
are the content and psychometric properties of their rat-
ing scales, interviews and questionnaires items similar?
As will be detailed below, this is challenging in several
ways. First, considerable method variance distinguishes
measurement approaches for each construct. Second, re-
search into each construct aims to measure self-
experience, which involves assessment of complex, fluid
and multifaceted cognitive acts which by their nature are
difficult to measure objectively and precisely.
To surmount these challenges, this paper will compare
research on metacognition, social cognition and menta-
lizing. After summarizing the constructs, measurement
strategies, and general findings across these three areas,
we discuss the unique contribution of metacognitive re-
search in terms of experimental procedures, theory and
clinical applications. We will suggest how metacognitive
research using the integrative model may uniquely de-
scribe a set of processes at play as persons make sense
of and respond to what is emerging in the world. We
will suggest this research reveals a metacognitive frame-
work or architecture which, if compromised, would lead
to the loss of persons’ sense of their purposes, possibil-
ities, place in the world and cohesiveness of self, result-
ing in the subjective disturbances widely observed in
psychosis. Turning to clinical issues, we argue that meta-
cognitive research may offer an operational model of the
framework which, if repaired or restored, should pro-
mote the recovery of a coherent sense of self and others
in psychosis. Finally, the concrete implications for
recovery-oriented treatment for psychosis will be
discussed.
Before beginning, there are several caveats regarding
terminology. It has been noted that there is more than
one way to understand metacognition in psychosis [18].
To avoid confusion, we are therefore using the term
metacognition to refer to a spectrum of activities that
are integrative in nature and intersubjectively rooted [7,
19, 20]. Metacognition is integrative which is to say that
it enables persons to synthesize or piece together infor-
mation into a larger whole of themselves or others as
unique people. In other words, the whole, which here is
a sense of oneself and others as unique persons, is
greater than the sum of its parts, which here are individ-
ual experiences. To say that these are intersubjective is
to say further that the integrating of information into a
whole is always done with an actual or imagined other
person. For example, any idea formed about oneself is
always formed with someone else in dialogue or with an
imagined person who could potentially understand and
react to that idea. As described elsewhere, we consider
this consistent with Flavel’s original definition of meta-
cognition [21], which designated a range of activities that
enable reflection and awareness of oneself and others in
the world [22]. The other potentially controversial term
we have chosen is psychosis. We purposefully chose this
term because it is broader than the term schizophrenia
while being more specific than serious mental illness,
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allowing for a flexible application of metacognitive re-




The construct of metacognition as studied across cogni-
tive, educational, developmental and abnormal psych-
ology, refers to a set of activities which involve thinking
about one’s thinking and responding accordingly to what
is happening in the moment in one’s life [21]. The inte-
grative model of metacognition has been applied to ex-
plain the alterations in self-experience thought to be at
the root of the subjective experience of psychosis. In this
model, metacognition has been proposed to refer to a
spectrum of activities. These include awareness of
discrete experiences which can have embodied, affective
and cognitive aspects. This is to say that metacognition
can involve being aware of one’s own specific thoughts,
beliefs, emotions, desires and experiences within one’s
body (e.g. tension in one’s forehead).
Metacognition also makes it possible for a person to
see and reflect upon how different specific experiences
may be related to one another (e.g. an awareness of how
certain thoughts and emotions might be related the ex-
perience of bodily tension) and then synthesize those
into a broader and evolving sense of oneself and others
(e.g. an awareness of how certain thoughts are distres-
sing and lead to tension in the moment within the larger
context of a psychological conflict the person has been
facing over the last several months) [23]. In this model,
metacognition is thus integrative. It involves a process
by which individual experiences are understood in terms
of their relationship to one another and ultimately inte-
grated into a larger sense of a person as more than the
sum of single experiences. The larger sense a person
might form of themselves or others, enabled by meta-
cognitive processes, is importantly never static. The hol-
istic sense a person has of themselves is likely to be
influenced and changed by new discrete experiences,
while the meaning assigned to a specific experience is
likely to be influenced by one’s sense of self. For ex-
ample, an experience of becoming visibly angry might
mean something different to someone who thinks about
themselves as unflappable and nonreactive as opposed to
righteous and enjoying conflict. In parallel, the experi-
ence of being visibly angry, if it is remarkable or happens
enough times, may lead one to form an idea about them-
self as different than unflappable and nonreactive.
There are several qualities that metacognition cannot
be reduced to in the integrated model. First, the nature
of metacognition is not necessarily the product of willful
act. A person may decide to reflect upon a given experi-
ence or something about the nature of their life and
consequently realize something important. Metacogni-
tion may also involve automatic processes such that an
awareness of a given experience or of something larger
going on in one’s life may simply occur to a person with-
out purposefully directing their attention to those issues.
Second, metacognitive acts cannot be said to be purely
solitary mentalistic acts. A thought about oneself may
occur when one is alone. However, regardless of whether
another person is present, the ideas we form about our-
selves and others are always constructed with a potential
audience in mind. For any sense of ourselves we have,
there is also a sense of how others, real or imagined,
might respond. This is to say that metacognition is not
about the formation of final ideas within the solitude of
one’s mind but occurs in intersubjective contexts [19].
Third, metacognitive acts are not tied to just thoughts
about oneself. A person can notice and form ideas about
others, one’s larger community and the possible usages
of that knowledge to make sense of and respond to long-
standing and newly emergent challenges [7, 20, 24]. Fi-
nally, metacognition is not something that can be
categorized as intact versus not intact nor compromised
by one set of problems. Metacognitive capacity can vary
between persons with different degrees of deficits that
can be caused by multiple social, psychological and bio-
logical processes.
Applied to psychosis, deficits in metacognition have
been suggested to result in a sense of oneself and others
as relatively more fragmented, resulting in the subjective
sense of diminished self-experience reported in qualita-
tive research [6]. In a manner consistent with the initial
formulations of Bleuler [25] and Jung [26], decrements
in metacognition have been suggested to explain how
persons diagnosed with those conditions experience
fragmentation of thoughts, affect and will, withdraw
from social interaction, and understand themselves and
the world in ways that are often inaccessible to others
[7].
Measurement
To measure decrements in metacognition within psych-
osis, an interview was developed to elicit a sample of
how persons think about their life and its possibilities
and challenges. To date, the most commonly used
method is a semi-structured interview, the Indiana Psy-
chiatric Illness Interview, which asks participants to offer
a general narrative of their lives and experiences of psy-
chosocial challenges [27]. This in turn required the de-
velopment of a quantitative scale to assess participant’s
metacognitive capacity as reflected within that interview.
To date, the most commonly used measure is the Meta-
cognition Assessment Scale Abbreviated (MAS-A) [7].
Developed from the Metacognition Assessment Scale
[20] (MAS), the MAS-A provides separate scales to
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assess metacognitive capacity for thinking about the self
(self-reflectivity), others (awareness of others), one’s
place in the community (decentration) and one’s ability
to develop and enact plans based on that information
(mastery). The MAS-A departs primarily from the MAS
in that the items of each of the four scales reflect a spe-
cific metacognitive act that is ordered numerically by
level of complexity. Lower scores reflect a more frag-
mented experiential field per domain whereas higher
scores reflect greater degrees of integration. Adequate
psychometric properties have been reported [28].
Though less studied, other methods exist for assessing
these forms of metacognition including the Metacogni-
tive Assessment Scale Revised [29].
Research on psychosocial correlates over the last three
years
Using these methods, research has tested the assertion
that deficits in metacognitive capacity are prominent ele-
ments in a network of disturbances that culminate in the
interruption of the lives of persons diagnosed with
psychosis. At the level of more basic biological pro-
cesses, studies have linked metacognitive deficits with al-
terations in phenomena that underpin social behavior,
including levels of oxytocin [30] and linguistic structures
that allow for communication [31, 32]. Metacognition
has also been linked to interpersonal functioning [33–
35] as well as the processes that support social connec-
tions, including empathy [36–38]. Deficits in metacogni-
tion also have been linked to self-compassion [39, 40]
and the richness of personal narrative [41], as well as be-
ing implicated in influencing the association between
emotional distress and positive symptoms [42]. Other
studies have found that alterations in metacognition are
linked to changes in neurocognition and, in a formal
network analysis, metacognition was found to be a cen-
tral node in a network that included social cognition,
neurocognition and symptoms [43]. Concerning clinical
phenomena, a substantial number of cross-cultural stud-
ies have linked metacognition with negative symptoms
[44–46], in particular with expressive negative symptoms
[47, 48], and issues related to clinical insight [8], motiv-
ation [49], and intrapsychic function [50].
Advances in treatment
As work on links with psychosocial functioning has
moved forward, the potential of metacognition as a treat-
ment target has attracted increasing interest. One such
treatment is Metacognitive Reflection and Insight Therapy
[51] (MERIT). MERIT is a form of integrative individual
psychotherapy that seeks to enhance a person’s abilities to
form an integrated sense of themselves and others and to
use that sense to manage challenges and pursue the possi-
bility within their lives. It conceptualizes the mechanisms
of action in a manner analogous to physical therapy. Spe-
cifically, patients, within the context of a therapeutic rela-
tionship, exercise the ability to form increasingly
integrated ideas about the self and others by steadily en-
gaging in metacognitive actions in accord with their
current, maximal capacity. Though still in its infancy, re-
search on this approach has suggested that this treatment
is acceptable to patients and leads to clinically meaningful
gains in randomized trials [52–54]. Qualitative and case
studies have linked this approach to metacognitive cap-
acity with growth in senses of agency, historicity, and
greater potential for future action [55, 56]. Other work in-
cludes a metacognitive oriented social skills training pro-
gram found to be effective in a randomized trial [57], and
interventions focused on the ability to doubt one’s conclu-
sions, which may impact a person’s larger sense of them-
selves and others [11, 58].
Summary
Research generated by the integrated model of metacog-
nition has revealed that many diagnosed with psychosis
experience themselves and others in relatively more frag-
mented ways. These experiences of fragmentation may
represent a central node in an interactive network that
underlies disability including impairments in other forms
of cognition and behavior. It offers a promising model of
how both negative symptoms and poor insight may
emerge and has spurred the development of novel psy-
chosocial approaches to treatment which may address
some of the most subjective and debilitating aspects of
psychosis.
Social cognition and psychosis
Conceptualization
Social cognition is a broad term that refers to a collection
of mental operations that underlie social interactions, in-
cluding the perception and interpretation of others’ inten-
tions, dispositions, and behaviors [59]. In research on
social cognition in psychosis, most studies have focused
on four domains. These include i) theory of mind, or the
ability to understand the thoughts and intentions of
others; ii) social perception, or the ability to identify so-
cially bound roles and rules; iii) attributional style/bias, or
how one infers the causes of events; and iv) emotion pro-
cessing, or the ability to perceive and use emotions, in-
cluding identifying emotions in others [17]. Persons with
psychosis tend to exhibit deficits in social cognition across
all domains [60], and these deficits have been linked to
numerous functional outcomes, including a strong con-
nection to community functioning [61]. In addition, these
deficits have been found to span the course of the illness,
including clinical high risk, early psychosis, and more pro-
longed groups [62, 63].
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Measurement
Measurement of social cognitive domains can be broadly
categorized into two approaches: social cognitive skills
(i.e. the capacity to make correct determinations, e.g.
theory of mind) and social cognitive biases (i.e. patterns
of interpretation unresponsive to evidence, e.g. hostile
attribution bias) [64]. Most commonly, social cognitive
domains in each category are assessed with task-based
assessments that require a respondent to engage or dem-
onstrate each skill. Self-report and interview-based mea-
sures are used less commonly [65], in part because
individuals may inaccurately rate their own skill [66].
Measures of social cognition have benefitted from in-
creased emphasis on methodological rigor and reliability
through the Social Cognition Psychometric Evaluation
study, which aimed to identify measures of the core do-
mains of social cognition and examine their psychomet-
ric characteristics [17]. Measures of social cognitive
skills had the strongest psychometric support, including
one measure of theory of mind, The Hinting Task [67],
and two measures of emotion processing, the Bell Lysa-
ker Emotion Recognition Task [68] and the Penn Emo-
tion Recognition Task [69, 70]. To illustrate, the Hinting
Task, historically cited as one of the most commonly uti-
lized measures of theory of mind within the field of so-
cial cognition [65], is still frequently utilized and tests
the capacity for persons to infer the intentions of indir-
ect speech [71, 72]. In this task, participants listen to ten
short passages of a verbal exchange between two charac-
ters, which concludes with one of the characters drop-
ping a “hint.” Participants must then explain what the
character intended by this hint and are scored on the ac-
curacy of their response [67].
Research on psychosocial correlates over the last three
years
A large body of research has demonstrated the relationship
between social cognition and functional outcomes like so-
cial functioning, social skills, independent living skills, and
community integration [61, 65]. More recent research has
continued to corroborate these findings. For example, it has
been demonstrated that deficits in thought, language and
communication domains are associated with worse func-
tional outcomes, including occupational functioning, ability
to communicate effectively in social situations, and general
community functioning [73]. Difficulties interpreting verbal
cues like humor and emotional prosody [74] as well as vis-
ual cues like facial emotion [75] have been linked with poor
social communication and functioning in psychosis. Fur-
ther, deficits in affective prosody recognition have been
found to be significantly associated with both role and so-
cial functioning in first episode schizophrenia [76]. It has
also been demonstrated that affective prosody recognition
is negatively correlated with disorganization symptoms,
whereas facial emotion recognition is negatively associated
with positive, negative, and disorganized symptom domains
[76]. More broadly, social cognition, especially domains of
theory of mind and emotion recognition, have been linked
to elevated disorganization [77], however the relationships
between positive and negative symptoms and social cogni-
tion are often more complex [78]. Recent results also sug-
gest a role for social cognitive impairments in other
meaningful outcomes for people with psychosis, such as
suicidal ideation [79] and homelessness [80].
Advances in treatment
Work on social cognition in psychosis has led to in-
creased interest in interventions focusing on social cog-
nition. These treatments have generally focused on two
methods of intervention: group-based treatments and
computerized cognitive remediation. These treatments
have shown promise in their impact on social cognition,
but study results have been mixed in demonstrating the
generalization of clinical benefits to in vivo social func-
tioning. Social Cognition and Interaction Training
(SCIT), a manual based group intervention, initially
showed promising results with improvements on social
cognition measures, including social and emotion per-
ception [81, 82] and social functioning [83]. However, a
more recent examination of SCIT found no significant
differences between an intervention group and treatment
as usual group on several social cognition outcomes,
though it should be noted that significant improvements
in quality of life, emotion recognition, and social skills
were found within the SCIT group [84]. Another group
intervention, Social Cognitive Skills Training, has dem-
onstrated positive effects, including improvement in
emotional processing [85], social functioning, and psy-
chiatric symptoms [86]. When integrated, cognitive re-
mediation approaches and social cognitive training
demonstrate greater improvements in working memory,
cognitive flexibility, verbal memory, and theory of mind
than a waitlist group, but groups tend to not differ on
measures of symptoms and social functioning [87].
These findings have raised questions as to whether im-
provements in social cognition from treatment may not
generalize to long-term or in vivo social functioning.
Some have attempted to address this issue by adding an
intervention component that allows for practicing social
skills; however, this approach appears to have not im-
proved durability of in vivo functioning benefits [88].
Summary
Research exploring social cognition has revealed that
many diagnosed with psychosis appear relatively less
able to correctly identify the thoughts, feelings and in-
tentions of others. Greater levels of these difficulties ap-
pear to be a significant source of social dysfunction and
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are correlated with symptom severity. Social cognitive
deficits likely contribute to a vicious cycle in which diffi-
culties correctly apprehending the internal states of
others leads to isolation which then leads to exacerba-
tion of other features of psychosis. This work has
spurred the development of carefully defined interven-
tions which improve social cognition and can be easily
incorporated into existing treatment regimens.
Mentalizing and psychosis
Conceptualization
Mentalizing can be defined as the “ability to understand
actions by both other people and oneself in terms of
thoughts, feelings, wishes, and desires” [89] (p3). First in-
troduced as a higher-order mental process through which
individuals engage in representation and symbolization,
the term mentalization was used to characterize the
process by which individuals make meaning of human be-
havior within a context of understanding the mental activ-
ities of oneself and other people [90, 91]. Fonagy and
colleagues [92] then progressively outlined an attachment-
based approach to the development of mentalizing on the
basis of observed, early parent-child interactions in bor-
derline personality disorder [93] and other severe mental
disorders [94] in which there is a failure to understand
oneself because of a lack of access to or a negative regard
for others [95]. During this period, the construct of men-
talization was relabeled as mentalizing to highlight its pro-
cedural character [96] and its explicative and uncertain,
imaginative nature [97]. Bateman and Fonagy [89] focused
on three non-mentalizing and potentially pathogenic
modes: psychic equivalence (i.e. perceiving inner states to
be directly equivalent with events in the external world);
pretend mode (i.e. decoupling mental life from external
reality); and teleological mode (i.e. recognizing mental
states only if outcomes are physically observable). Menta-
lizing was further categorized to include four sub-
domains: automatic/explicit, self/other, affect/cognition,
and inner-focused/outer-focused [97, 98], illustrating the
dynamic nature of mentalizing as nested within varying
relational contexts [95]. At any one point, an individual
may consider the experiences of others while at the same
attending to their own thoughts or feelings. This process
may involve explicit, effortful reflection or operate impli-
citly and prior to any reflection [90].
Measurement
Common measures of capacity for mentalizing include
survey and transcript-based instruments. The Reflective
Functioning Questionnaire [99] and Parent Reflective
Functioning Questionnaire [100] are self-report mea-
sures designed to assess mentalizing capacity across two
subscales, which, respectively, represent salient aspects
of mentalizing and evaluate a parent’s ability to
understand their child’s behavior in terms of underlying
mental states. The Reflective Functioning Scale [101] is a
measure used to code mentalizing capacity within an
interview that provides opportunities for persons to re-
flect on their childhood experiences, particularly in the
context of their relationships to caregivers (e.g. Adult
Attachment Interview). In addition to assessing the pa-
tient’s capacity for mentalizing, instruments have been cre-
ated to assess the therapist’s capacity to mentalize. Such
measures include the Therapist Mental Activities Scale,
Therapist Relationship Interview, and Mentalization-Based
Treatment (MBT) adherence and competence scale, which
assess the therapist’s own ability to mentalize as well as
their ability to promote the mentalizing process within
therapy [91]. A final approach to measuring mentalizing,
the interactional approach, derives from the assumption
that mentalizing occurs in relationships with others, or
within intersubjective contexts [91]. An example of this is
Conversational Analysis [102], a qualitative method that ex-
amines the structure and process of social interactions,
such as a therapy session. Across these studies, it may be
noted, the non-mentalizing modes (i.e. psychic equivalence,
pretend mode, teleological mode) are only partially and in-
directly assessed.
Research on psychosocial correlates over the last three
years
Deficits in mentalizing have been tied to a multitude of
poor outcomes [103]. Research has found that deficits in
mentalizing are linked to decreased community engage-
ment, reduced vocational functioning, as well as poorer
quality of life [90, 104]. Other studies, which have inves-
tigated whether aggression and violence are linked with
impaired mentalizing, offer conflicting views. One study
found that psychotically driven aggression was linked
with poorer mentalizing capacity [105], while another
found no difference in mentalizing between individuals
with schizophrenia spectrum disorders who are violent
versus those who are non-violent [106]. A recent study
found that mentalizing deficits act as a mediator be-
tween childhood abuse and negative symptoms in that
the effect of childhood abuse on the severity of negative
symptoms was amplified by the absence of the ability to
mentalize [107]. Most generally, a recent study con-
ducted by Boldrini and colleagues [108] suggests that
the presence of impaired mentalizing may predict the
development of psychosis itself.
Advances in treatment
Inspired by research on mentalizing and the emerging re-
covery movement for individuals with psychosis, psycho-
therapeutic interventions have been developed to target
mentalizing deficits in psychosis [90]. Mentalization-Based
Treatment for psychosis (MBT-p) is an adaptation of a
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therapeutic intervention originally developed for border-
line personality disorder. The primary premise of MBT-p
is that psychosis entails core deficits in the areas of aware-
ness of one’s own mind (e.g. failing to differentiate be-
tween one’s thoughts and external stimuli) and the minds
of others (e.g. difficulty in interpreting others’ intentions)
[109]. As a dynamic practice, MBT-p aims to promote
mentalizing ability to strengthen the ability to make sense
of interpersonal experiences and to better navigate social
life by recognizing how various social situations affect
thoughts, feelings, and motivations [90]. Interventions
focus on the patient’s experience in the present through
the therapist’s continued curiosity about the patient’s
thoughts, feelings, and intentions as well as by encour-
aging the sharing of narratives of social interactions [103].
Case studies have reported that MBT-p is linked to im-
provements in social functioning [103] and the decrease
of negative symptoms. A recent, randomized-controlled
trial found MBT-p led to significant improvements in so-
cial functioning at post-treatment and at 6-month follow
up. Results further revealed a trend toward better per-
formance on measures of mentalizing ability in the MBT-
p group and an increased effectiveness of MBT-p in early
psychosis versus prolonged psychosis [110].
Summary
Research exploring mentalizing has revealed that many
diagnosed with psychosis appear to experience less se-
cure levels of attachment and as a result are relatively
less able to consider the experience of others while at-
tending to their own thoughts or feelings. This process
may lead to reduction in persons forming coherent ideas
about what others want, think and feel. As has been
found in social cognition, greater levels of these difficul-
ties appear to be a significant source of social dysfunc-
tion. This work has also spurred the development of
interventions with psychodynamic roots which are less
structured than social cognition interventions and focus
on noticing and developing the ability to think about
others and one’s own relationship with them.
The unique experimental, theoretical and clinical
implications of metacognitive research in
psychosis
As illustrated in literature reviewed above, research on
metacognition in psychosis shares in common with re-
search on social cognition and mentalizing a concern
with problems persons have making sense of their self-
experience and the experience of others. Metacognition
is concerned with the degree to which persons sense of
self and others is integrated as opposed to fragmented.
Social cognition is concerned largely with the degree to
which other people’s emotional and cognitive experi-
ences can be correctly recognized and understood.
Mentalization is concerned with the formation of ideas
about oneself and others in the context of a history of
differing kinds of attachments with others.
Given these commonalities, as noted at the outset of
this paper, one question that arises is whether metacog-
nitive research in psychosis is really exploring anything
distinctive relative to research pursuing social cognition
and mentalizing. In response, we would suggest that this
review considered as whole reveals several unique ad-
vances offered by metacognitive research in terms of ex-
perimental procedures, theory and clinical information
that warrant its continued status as a unique construct.
Distinctive experimental procedures
First, metacognition, as operationalized using the MAS-
A, diverges from social cognition and mentalizing re-
search in its emphasis, consistent with work on person-
ality disorders [24, 111–113], that the senses of self and
others that are disturbed in psychosis involve automatic
and purposeful processes in which embodied, affective
and cognitive experiences are not successfully integrated
into a larger sense of the self or others. Metacognitive
research thus distinctively resists framing the experience
of the self and others as fundamentally modular or the
product of different dissociable processes. As something
that is more of a multidimensional activity than an ag-
gregate of discrete states, metacognition allows for an
awareness that is larger and more complex than the sum
of any supposed parts. It describes the processes though
which persons not only experience the world but make
interpretations of those experiences and adjust both
their behavior and ideas about that experience over time
in ways that can range along a continuum of fragmenta-
tion to integration.
In contrast to social cognition research, metacognition
is operationalized in a way that allows it to go beyond
measurements of the correctness of a certain perception.
The central tool of this research, the MAS-A, offers a
means of measuring processes that allow a person to be
more or less able to continually interpret and adjust
their sense of who they are, how they are related to
others and what they are doing in the world. Its four di-
mensions allow for an assessment of the degree to which
persons with psychosis are fitting together information
in an ongoing manner as they make sense of and re-
spond to what is happing in their lives in terms of their
well-being and needs, even during periods of significant
confusion and distress. A metacognitive deficit is thus
distinct from a social cognitive deficit. Whereas a social
cognitive deficit results in an identified point of failure
(e.g. mistaking someone’s emotional state), a metacogni-
tive deficit leads to failures in the process of evaluating
and responding to a changing world given one’s own
values or history. A metacognitive deficit thus does not
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represent an error, but instead less efficacious activity
within a network that is integrating information across
time and using that integrated information in response
to shifting contexts. It accordingly has the potential to
provide a unique and measurable marker in the puzzle
of how disturbances in genetics and basic brain function
and forms of social injustice are linked to the struggles
of a particular person seeking to move forward in their
lives in the midst of psychosis.
In common with mentalizing research, metacognitive
research understands intersubjectivity as a basis for the
mutual understanding which underpins interpersonal re-
lationships. Metacognitive research distinguishes itself
from that approach, however, in its consideration of the
role of each person’s unique interpretation of and re-
sponse to what happens when action is taken on the
basis of those interpretations. As operationalized by the
MAS-A, metacognition allows for the measurement of a
more multifaceted kind of meaning making, one in
which there may be more complex interactions than
afforded by most approaches to measuring mentalizing.
By considering through the use of separate scales on the
MAS-A both the ability to form ideas about oneself and
others in the larger world (i.e. decentration) and use re-
flective knowledge to respond to psychosocial challenges
(i.e. mastery) as distinct from self-reflection and reflec-
tion about others, the metacognitive approach offers
more points of access to disturbances in subjective ex-
perience in psychosis, which may be why measures of
metacognition tend to be more closely associated with
measures of psychopathology than measures of menta-
lizing [7, 114]. Finally, metacognitive deficits also appear
to have consequences or manifestations in the world dis-
tinct from those of mentalizing deficits. When viewed
from a broad perspective, metacognitive deficits culmin-
ate in the loss of an ability to fully engage in and experi-
ence membership in one’s community through shared
participation in its activities while accepting and fulfill-
ing required roles and holding certain values within that
community. In contrast, with mentalizing deficits we see
changes that are more focused on the distress of an indi-
vidual person, including the loss of emotional equilib-
rium, internal balance and comfort with key social
attachments.
Distinctive theoretical aspects
As metacognitive research has enabled the measurement
of processes that support a persons’ making sense of and
responding to experience, and then continually readjust-
ing, it also offers ways to think about the person who is
experiencing psychosis. Specifically, beyond the contribu-
tions of the literature of social cognition and mentalizing
research, metacognitive research offers a framework to
think about the person who is living with psychosis and
not just their errors or discomfort. It allows us to under-
stand particular ways in which the self is experienced
which may offer a unifying conceptualization of more than
a century of observations about the disturbances in the
phenomenology of psychosis.
Since the forebearers of existential philosophy, includ-
ing Kierkegaard [115] and Nietzsche [116], self-
experience has been understood as dynamic and multifa-
ceted, and as something experienced as taking place in
changing, diverse situations of a person’s life over time.
This is to say, consistent with the experimental methods
of metacognitive research, that persons’ experience of
themselves involves an ongoing process in which they
interpret and respond to what is happening to them in
the moment and over larger periods of time [117]. As
described in the early stages of modern psychology
[118], we experience ourselves as we participate in the
world, and so self-experience is always a function of an
interaction [119] and something that is dependent upon
a given context [120].
In this light, beyond what is offered by social cognition
and mentalizing research, metacognitive research helps
us understand how disturbances in self-experience
emerge in psychosis as the interactions and integration
which allow for a sense of self are compromised by
metacognitive deficits. It is not the what of a particular
perception (as in social cognition) but the how of the
unique way in which an individual organizes their un-
derstanding of their life.
Specifically, we suggest that research on metacognition
in psychosis allows us to see how disturbances in four
interrelated but conceptually distinct dimensions of self-
experience: purpose, possibility, positionality, and parti-
ality could emerge in psychosis and affect persons in the
ways revealed in empirical research [121]. The first two,
purpose and possibility, refer to how persons know
themselves relative to the formation of an ongoing sense
of the aims they are pursuing in their lives and what
may possibly come from that pursuit. These purposes,
which distinguish a person as a unique being, can be im-
mediate, for example, accomplishing a particular task, or
larger in the sense of becoming a particular type of per-
son. The possibilities at hand can involve a sense of the
means or the barriers to achieving a potential end.
With the deficits in metacognition found in psychosis,
however, a person might experience themselves as with-
out a purpose or hope for fulfillment ahead of them. For
example, impairments in self-reflectivity could con-
cretely weaken the links between different experiences,
disabling the potential to recognize one’s purposes and
possibilities in the moment and their evolution over
time. A person might make a correct judgement about a
discrete experience but be unable to see the web of rela-
tionships that exist in the moment and as they evolve
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over time give it a particular meaning. The range of pur-
poses that could be pursued in the flow of life would,
therefore, be reduced as would the ability to assess how
well one is achieving those purposes. Moreover, one
would be less able to evaluate whether those purposes
remain worth pursuing. And without a reply to ques-
tions like, “why am I doing something” or “is it worth
doing this?”, it would be very difficult to answer the
question, “who am I?”
Matching observations from psychiatric rehabilitation
of alterations in self-experience in psychosis, a person
might appear to have lost a sense of why they should do
something they had been doing for years as well as what
might come from doing something that is meaningful
[122]. This is also consistent with narrative research,
which has found that a sense of purpose is less discern-
able in the life stories of persons with psychosis [41, 123,
124]. More generally, without a sense of one’s purposes
and possibilities to anchor a growing sense of self, the
symbolization of self and experience might diminish as
found in psychoanalytic accounts of the subjective ex-
perience of psychosis [125–127] and match what has
been described as a lack of existential agency [128]. Fi-
nally, without purposes emerging in response to and
alongside possibilities, and thus without a working sense
of who one is, a sense of the uniqueness of one’s experi-
ence might also wane, leading to states described by
phenomenologists of self-experience in psychosis as
minimal and lacking the quality of mineness, or what is
referred to as ipseity [129, 130].
The third kind of disturbance that could affect sense
of self in psychosis could occur in one’s sense of pos-
ition, or how the self is experienced as contextually re-
lated to others, social structures, or a point in history.
For example, in a given moment, the sense one has of
oneself, including one’s purposes and possibilities, may
involve seeing oneself as a current teacher and former
student, a former lover but longstanding friend, or a
current detractor of someone one supported in one’s
youth, which one now regards as overly conservative.
The possibilities and purposes that are inexorably part
of a sense of self are not free-standing or abstract ideas
but accrue meaning (and only become possible) because
they are in relationship to other people in multiple con-
texts. With the kinds of metacognitive deficits observed
in psychosis, especially decrements in one’s awareness of
others and broader community, past connections linking
one’s immediate experience to those of others would
also become significantly less available, diminishing the
sense of one’s position in the world and possibilities re-
garding who one could become. If the capacity for mas-
tery, or the ability to use reflective metacognitive
knowledge to respond to psychosocial problems, were
impaired, persons would be left with little sense of how
to manage their lives, diminishing their sense of possibil-
ities, including cooperative action with others, which
would further erode a sense of who one is relative to
others in the world.
Corresponding to experiences described by earlier psy-
choanalysis [131, 132] and existential psychiatry [133,
134], this would result in a person with psychosis experi-
encing interactions with others as fundamentally dis-
turbing and relatively lacking a sense of intersubjectivity.
Instead of an ordinary interaction offering reassurance
about one’s place in the world, it might only provoke
more confusion and hence increase feelings of vulner-
ability and worries about the intentions of that other
person. This is also consistent with descriptions of the
devastating loss of one’s place in the larger community
as described by persons with lived experience of psych-
osis [135] and matches accounts of the centrality of re-
capturing that place in recovery [2, 136].
The fourth kind of disturbance in self-experience that
may emerge in the wake of metacognitive deficits in
psychosis could be referred to as a lack of partiality. Par-
tiality is intended to refer to an ongoing sense that the
self can never be captured or characterized by any one
thing and instead is made up of many things that are
likely to change. In other words, a healthy sense of self is
partial in that it cannot be reduced in a lasting final form
as defined by one set of wishes, thoughts, or emotions.
With the deficits in self-reflectivity and decentration
found in psychosis, persons would be unlikely to have a
working sense of themselves as having multiple facets
which may be contradictory and change over time.
Without this quality of partiality, the cohesion of a larger
sense of self would be threatened by inconsistencies and
dissolve [137, 138]. This could result in a sense of self in
which different aspects of the self are experienced as ac-
tive but unrelated to one another, where no aspect of
the self is distinguished from another, and hence all are
experienced as absent.
This is not to say that social cognition and mentalizing
are not involved in a unique person’s purposes, possibil-
ities, positions, and partiality. They are. With deficits in
social cognition, it would be more difficult to discern
one’s positions, especially as they pertain to interper-
sonal relationships, and that would compromise one’s
ability to understand and pursue intimate relationships
and to cooperate with others. Similarly, it would be diffi-
cult for a person to describe and pursue larger purposes
in life if one’s mentalizing abilities were weakened. Yet
neither view quite captures the temporal dynamism nor
the breadth of the dimensions that can be quantified and
mapped by the integrated, metacognitive perspective.
Though social cognition is able to clearly describe and
measure discrete elements of experience, it cannot cap-
ture subjective, unique features of an individual’s
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experience of themselves (e.g. in terms of one’s pur-
poses, possibilities, positions, and partiality). Similarly,
mentalizing clarifies connections between attachment,
affect and the forming of a sense of others, but it also is
not able as comprehensively as the metacognitive ap-
proach to consider the broader range of activities and in-
teractions that make up community participation and
the experience of one’s life as uniquely unfolding. Allow-
ing an understanding of how someone makes sense of
the suffering inherent in their experience of psychosis,
metacognitive research uniquely allows us to understand
and relate to the suffering of different persons in terms
of their experience of everyday life.
Distinctive clinical applications
Practical issues of treatment reveal perhaps the most dis-
tinctive features of the research on the integrative model
of metacognition. If metacognition describes an architec-
ture or framework for meaning making, which if com-
promised results in profound subjective disturbances,
then it may also describe an architecture which if
repaired or reconstituted should promote recovery along
these same subjective lines of experience. One clear im-
plication is that treatment requires more than addressing
specific deficits or remediating impairments in specific
skills. It may require the promotion of the ongoing inte-
gration of experiences. This integration would be ex-
pected to enable persons to recapture a sense of self-
cohesion which includes a rich sense of what they are
seeking in life, what is possible for them, and where
there is a meaningful place for them in the world. It
would also be expected to cultivate an ability to acknow-
ledge and creatively respond to experiences which offer
any number of significant challenges or possibilities.
This is not to say that social cognitive approaches
might not also enable persons to make sense of what
they are facing. It’s direct effects though seem limited to
helping persons make fewer errors. With fewer errors or
greater awareness of how one reasons about others, a
person might well be able to make more complex kinds
of meaning later, but that later process is left up to the
patient to carry out elsewhere. Certainly, mentalization
treatments in common with the metacognitive ap-
proaches noted above, including MERIT, understand
intersubjectivity as a requirement for psychotherapy to
effectively address how persons think about themselves
and others. Yet some metacognitive approaches to treat-
ments, such as MERIT, also factor in each person’s
unique interpretation of and response to what happens
when those interpretations are enacted while also em-
phasizing how disturbances in or support for one’s sense
of self come from multiple sources outside of dyadic ex-
changes. By considering decentration as its own, quanti-
fiable variable, metacognitive treatment approaches may
have broader opportunities for understanding outcomes
resulting from these interventions.
Conclusions and further directions
In this paper we have sought to address whether re-
search employing the integrated model of metacognition
offers unique insights in psychosis relative to social cog-
nition and mentalizing research. To that end, we have
presented the key conceptual features of and recent re-
search from each field of study, all of which point to dis-
turbances in the experience of the self and other. We
then offered a review of four aspects of self-experience
relevant in psychosis about which metacognitive re-
search may offer unique insights. On the basis of this,
we have suggested that metacognitive research brings
added breadth and dynamism to the study of self-
experience in psychosis. It uniquely reveals a dynamic
architecture that, should it be compromised, may result
in specific disturbances in persons’ sense of themselves
in terms of their purposes, possibilities, position in the
world and cohesion in the face of contradiction. From
this vantage point, we see a broader interactive, socially
situated network of capacities in which persons encoun-
ter and respond to challenges as members of a commu-
nity, which affords a uniquely rich sense of what
promotes and what blocks the path to recovery.
Practically, metacognitive research illuminates how
subjective disturbances in psychosis can be reflective of
more than a singular failure at one focal point or state of
emotional distress, leading to a vision of treatment that
returns to fundamentally grappling with issues of mean-
ing making and agency. Metacognitive research thus
makes it possible to begin to think of psychotherapy that
addresses metacognition as a “technology of the self,” in
the sense offered by Foucault [139]. In addition to teach-
ing skills and addressing symptoms, this research reveals
how treatment can also engage persons with psychosis
in the construction of meaning and community mem-
bership, which includes noticing what has happened to
them, what they need, as well as what is potentially just
and unjust in their community.
There are limitations, however. We have focused on
the singular contributions of one model of metacognitive
research in psychosis. It would be fruitful to consider
other measurements of metacognitive capacity and
analyze them in a similar light. Moreover, more work is
needed to determine whether unique contributions also
can be found in the research tracking social cognition
and mentalizing across disturbances in the experience of
self and others in psychosis. Other work is needed that
measures all three constructs and their unique and cu-
mulative effects on outcome. While epistemological dif-
ferences and implications can be discussed, the
differences in quantitative studies are a direct function
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of the validity and reliability of the reported tools. Some
of the results on which we based our hypotheses may
therefore reflect measurement biases rather than real
theoretical and clinical differences.
Finally, we have not considered the overlap between
mentalizing and social cognition which in some work
have been considered as overlapping themselves [140].
We have not explicitly explored the overlap or common-
alities among metacognition, social cognition and men-
talizing research in psychosis. Despite the differences
revealed here, there are elements common to all three
and to various pairs. Future work is needed to explore
these commonalities in order to work towards a unified
model of subjective disturbance in psychosis and the re-
quirements of recovery-oriented treatments.
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